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Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University I would
like to thank my research assistants, Ige Bolodeoku and Freya Kodar, for

Introduction : the corporation as a legal
fiction
The theme of fictions in law in the context of corporate and
securities law raises some intriguing issues, and I am particularly
grateful for the opportunity it gives me to rethink some of my
previous work on corporate law. At one level, the topic of
fictions in law is an obvious one for an Anglo-American
corporate lawyer. One of the first principles of Anglo-American
corporate law that students learn is that the corporation is best
understood as a legal fiction. The principle is otherwise known as
the doctrine of the separate legal personality of the corporation.
This is the idea that law grants a corporation a legal identity that is
separate from its owners or shareholders, on the one hand, and
those who make decisions on its behalf — officers and directors
— on the other. Thus, the corporation is a fictitious creation of
law. The doctrine has had a tremendous rhetorical and persuasive
power in legal thinking and everyday discourse about the
corporation, and is an example of the power of legal fiction to
constitute reality. People talk about corporate citizens, especially
in recent debates about the social responsibility of corporations or
ongoing debates about the criminality of corporations.' What I
want to do in this talk is to interrogate that core assumption about
the corporation, that it has a separate legal identity, not so much
from the point of view of contesting the idea's philosophical
elegance or its political consequences — both of which are
indeed significant— but rather from the position that the
doctrine, and its creation, the fictional corporation, is being
increasingly undermined from within and without corporate law

1

Academic discussion of the social responsibility
of corporaUons .s
traceable to the debate between Dodd and Bed* See^emck TODD
For
whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?", 45 Harv. L Rev. 1145i (1932),
Adolf A BERLE, "For whom Corporate Managers are Trustees . A Note ,
Harv L Rev. 1365 (1932). For the corporate criminality debate, see John
C COFFEE, "'No Soul to Damn : No Body to Kick : An Unscandalized
Inquiiy into the Problem of Corporate
^
Review 386 (1981); Gilbert GEIS and Joseph DIMHJTC^ ShouldJVfe
Prosecute Corporations and/or Individuals? , in Frank
TmonTo
SNIDER (ed.), Corporate Crime. Contemporary Debates, Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1995, p. 72.
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itself, such that doubt is cast on the sustainability of this core idea
about the corporation. Having tried to demonstrate this
disintegration, I want to suggest a couple of possible reasons for
it.
The legal personhood of the corporation is taken to have a
number of consequences, well known to students of corporate
law. Chief among these are the facts that the corporation can
cany on business, own property, have rights, sue and be sued
and have a perpetual existence. A further extremely important
consequence is said to flow from the separate existence of the
corporation, that is, the limited liability of shareholders for
corporate debts.2 Since a corporation is legally separate from the
shareholders who own shares in it, these shareholders are not
liable for debts incurred by the corporation that it is unable to
pay. This is the feature that distinguishes corporations from most
other forms of business organization, like partnerships or sole
proprietorships, and obviously works to protect assets of
shareholders from being seized by the corporation's creditors.

I.

The history of the creation of the
corporate legal form

It is also widely believed by corporate lawyers that the
discovery" of the legal fiction of the corporation's separate
personality occurred in the English House of Lords case of
Salomon v. Salomon in 1897.3 However, Paddy Ireland, who
has written extensively on the history of the corporate legal form,
points out that the process of recognition of the legal form of the
corporation in England was a much longer one than can be
encompassed in a single legal decision. The process began with
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 18444 which applied only to
what were called "joint stock" companies (what we would now
Pu^^c" companies) and ended with the Companies Act
1907,5 which extended the use of the legal form to all types of

2

R.S.C. (1985), c. C-44, s. 45.

3

Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.).

4

The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 1844 (U.K.), 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110.

5

The Companies Act 1907, 1907 (U.K.), 7 Edw. VII, c. 50.
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business firms. He attributes what was in fact a relatively slow
rate of acceptance of the idea of the corporation as a separate legal
entity in part to the fact that the increasing "centralisation of
capital" represented by the economic form of the joint stock
company was widely seen in negative terms. This was largely
because of the violation it represented of the idea of individual
responsibility for commercial obligations. Meanwhile, extension
of the separate legal entity status to so-called "private" firms was
spurred by liability fears flowing from the "Great Depression" in
the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It took a
significant amount of time for the idea of the corporation to attain
respectability and it only attained this when the form could be
used by partnership-type entities. So Ireland argues that two
factors were crucial to the development and widespread use of the
legal form of the company. On the one hand, its link to the
success of the economic form of business enterprise, as an
arrangement whereby small amounts of capital could be
contributed to the large economic enterprises such as public
utilities, canals and railways that developed during the industrial
revolution, in part accounted for its acceptance. But even more
importantly it was the link to the availability of limited liability for
shareholders that ultimately secured its dominance.6

II. Economic analysis of the separate
personality doctrine
In the contemporary analysis of Anglo-American corporate
law, there is little doubt that neo-classical economics cuirently
dominates the field as a theoretical perspective from which to
describe and evaluate the norms of corporate law J Interestingly,
those writing from this perspective are somewhat ambivalent
about the importance of what is considered in legal doctrinal
terms to be the distinguishing feature of a corporation
its

See generally P. IRELAND, "The Triumph of the Company Legal Form,
1856-1914", in J. ADAMS (ed.), Essays for Clive Schmitthoff, Oxford,
Ireland, Professional Books, 1983, p. 29.
B.R. CHEFFINS, Company Law : Theory, Structure and Operario/^^ford,
Clarendon Press, 1997; Frank H. EASTERBROOK and Dame R. FISCHEL
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, Mass., Harvar
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separate legal personhood. Some law and economics scholars
argue that the doctrine of corporate legal personality is
economically important because it allows "the capital for a
business venture to be collected from a number of investors, over
time, while avoiding the costs of transfer of the venture's assets
when new participants are admitted, or existing participants
depart."8 It also allows the business itself to be transferred on a
more cost-effective basis through the transfer of its shares, rather
than its assets. In other words, because what owners of a
corporation own are shares of the company rather than a
proportionate share of the assets of the company, ownership of
the company can change without disruption to the affairs of the
business, thus reducing transaction costs. It should be noted,
however, that this rationale for the legal fiction of the corporation
is really a rationale for developing the idea of the freely
transferable share as an autonomous form of property, which is
not an inevitable consequence of the separate legal personality
doctrine.9
On the other hand, other law and economics scholars such
as Brian Cheffins argue that:
those writing from an economic perspective attach little
significance to the fact that as a matter of legal formality a
company is a separate entity. They emphasise instead that a
business firm is a focal point for bargaining relationships
entered into voluntarily and thus operates as a "nexus of
contracts."10 As such, a company resembles a market, which is

8

D. GODDARD, "Corporate Personality — Limited Recourse and its Limits",
in R.B. GRANTHAM and C.E.F. RICKETT (ed.), Corporate Personality in
the 20th Century, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 11 and 18.

9

See generally P. IRELAND, I. GRIGG-SPALL and D. KELLY, "The
Conceptual Foundations of Modem Company Law", in P. FITZPATRICK and
A. HUNT (ed.), Critical Legal Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1987, p. 149.

10

Examples of such accounts include : Ronald H. COASE, "The Nature of the
Firm", 4 Economica 386 (1937) reprinted in Oliver E. WILLIAMSON and
Sidney G. WINTER (ed.), The Nature of the Firm : Origins, Evolution and
Development, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991; Michael C.
JENSEN and MECKLING, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs, and Capital Structure", 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
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a medium where buyers and sellers engage in free and willing
exchanged

These buyers and sellers include shareholders, directors,
debtholders, creditors, suppliers, employees and so on. Cheffins
is aware of the potential critique that parties such as shareholders
and employees may not really bargain but act on a "take it or
leave it" basis12 — or the opposite might equally be the case,
especially in relation to employees —, but he still finds it helpful
to "deconstruct the corporate entity and examine directly the
relationships between the key participants."13 This allows the
analyst to understand the corporation as an efficient mechanism
for the development of bargaining relationships among
participants who interact "on the basis of reciprocal [and
presumably rational] expectations and behaviour."14

III. How does a corporation act?
The effect of the doctrine of separate personality, according
to Klein and Coffee, is that both lawyers and laypersons reify the
corporation.13 We think of it as being capable of acting, of
owning property, and also, as other areas of law suggest, of
paying taxes or committing crimes. Yet within corporate law
there is a recognition that corporations may only act throug
human agents. Corporate law solves in the following way the
problem for action that it has created in recognizing the fictional
corporation. It establishes categories of actors (i.e. directors and
officers or managers) who operate the corporation. T is crea es
quite a bit of conceptual difficulty, for who is to appoint these

11
12
13
14

, c
15

B.R. CHEFFINS, "Using Theory to Study Law: A Company Law
Perspective", 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 197-209 (1999).
See Victor BRUDNEY, "Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, an t e
Rhetoric of Contract", 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403 (1985).
B.R. CHEFFINS, loc.cit., note 11, 32.
Id. See also Jonathan R. MACEY and Geof^y ^ MILLER Xorporam
Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspect.ve", (1993) 43 V. of Toronto L. J.
401.
, ....
W a Ki FIN and J C COFFEE JR., Business Organization and Finance .
W.A. KLEIN and J.L. Lurrnn jix ,
ork
Foundation
N
Y
Legal and Economic Principles, 6 ed., wesmury,
Press, 1996.

132

LES FICTIONS DU DROIT — FICTIONS IN THE LAW

agents? The answer is that the owners of the company are
required to appoint the directors/managers, but directors are
agents (or principals) of the legal person of the corporation. This
is operationalized by creating a fiduciary duty of directors and
officers to act "in the best interests of the corporation" and to act
with "care, diligence and skill" in the management of the
company's affairs. These duties must be owed to the company,
while acting on its behalf, since it is separate entity from the
shareholders. It is the corporation which is the principal. Again
law and economics analysis ignores the purity of the legal
distinction between the corporation and its shareholders by
talking about the idea of "agency costs", which is the idea that
self-serving managerial conduct imposes costs, not on the
corporation, but on shareholders, thus reducing the value of their
investment.

OF BUTTERFLIES AND BITTERNESS?

which courts have ignored the fiction of the corporate entity and
assessed liability for a debt owing by the corporation against its
shareholder(s), according to common law principles. These
decisions have often been justified by judicial decision-makers as
being necessary to produce "just and equitable" results in specific
cases of contractual or tortious claims against corporations. Thus
courts have "lifted the veil" of the corporation where there has
been fraud involved, where the company was incorporated for
"an improper purpose", where the company is really an agent of
the shareholder, where a group of corporations are so connected
as to constitute "a single economic unit" and so on. His review of
these cases suggested, he argued, that there has been :
a continuous expansion of the exceptions to limited liability in
a rather inconsistent fashion depending on where a court decides
the economic risk should fall. As the limits continue to
expand, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand the
original principle. ...It is no longer sufficient to simply advise
that incorporation will suffice to limit one's liability to the
investment being made.17

I V . The decline (and fall?) of the legal fiction
I've made the claim that the notion of the corporation as a
fictional person is generally seen as firmly established in the legal
and popular imagination. If there are some conceptual difficulties
about how the corporation actually acts these have now been well
settled. What I want to try to argue here is that the fiction is
actually becoming increasingly untenable because of doctrinal and
other analytical developments which, viewed collectively, work
to destabilize the power of the fiction and suggest that the form is
in fact much more fragile than might be thought. Specifically the
fiction is being increasingly undermined from within the
doctrines of corporate and securities law themselves. At least six
or seven pressure points, I think, can be articulated.

A.

Jurisprudence on lifting the veil

In the 1997 Queen's Business Law Symposium on "The
Future of Corporation Law", William Friedman presented a
paper16 where he considered the myriad of Canadian cases in

Thus discretionary decision-making by courts, with the aim
of doing justice in individual cases, has steadily encroached on
the "purity" of the legal fiction.

B.

Creditors of small corporations request personal
guarantees from the corporation's shareholders

It is relatively uncontroversial that, as an empirical matter,
creditors — often financial institutions — of small corporations
routinely request personal guarantees from the corporation s
shareholder(s). In other words, creditors contract around the
legal principle of separate personality with its attendant
implication of limited liability for shareholders, in order to
attempt to secure their loan to the company. As a very hig
proportion, numerically, of Canadian companies are in the
category of small, closely-held companies, this is a practically

Queen's Annual

Business Law Symposium 1997, Toronto, Carswell, 1999,

p. 1 [hereinafter The Future of Corporation Law].
16

W.P. FRIEDMAN, "The Limits of Limited Liability", in The Future of
Corporation Law : Issues and Perspectives : Papers Presented at the
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17

Id, p. 24.
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significant departure from reliance on the legal principle. On the
other hand, in relation to publicly-traded companies, the
Canadian phenomenon of control blocks of shares frequently
being held in family-owned hands could also be used as empirical
support for the argument that the legal separation of shareholders
from the corporations they control is more notional than real.'s

C.

Personal liability of officers and directors

An often-repeated concern about the context of corporate
decision-making in Canada is the alleged frequency with which
governments encroach on the principle of corporate separate
personality by imposing personal liability on directors and senior
officers of corporations, by means of statutory provisions both
inside and outside the business corporations acts, for acts done
on behalf of the corporation. While the suggestion that this state
of affairs has resulted in a flight from corporate directorships has
not been empirically substantiated in Canada, ^ it is true that this
is an increasingly used form of sanction imposed by legislation.
Examples include liability for impairing the solvency of the
corporation, breaches of disclosure requirements of securities
legislation, non-payment of employee wages, environmental
offences, failure to fulfil obligations under pension benefits
legislation, occupational health and safety offences, failure to
deduct or remit employee tax liabilities and so on.20 On the
common law side, the 1998 decision of Budd v. Gentra21 raised

18

Diane FRANCIS, Controlling Interests : Who Owns Canada?, Toronto,
C.B. Media Ltd., 1989, p. 70-71, cited in James GILLIES, Boardroom
Renaissance, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992.

19

See however the 1996 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on
Banking, Trade and Commerce (Kirby Report) which noted that "Highpro i e resignations from the boards of significant Canadian corporations
because of concerns over personal liability for corporate debts brought the
issue to the attention of the media and the public at large." [at p. 12]. At
footnote 39, the report noted that in 1992, the directors of Westar Mining,
^an ir ines an^ Peoples Jewellers resigned over concerns about their
liability. See also the report of the TSE Committee on Corporate
overnance in Canada, Where were the Directors?, December 1994.

20

tte CBCAbility °f

direCt0rS under the CBCA< see

21

(1998) 43 B.L.R. (2d) 27 (Ont. C.A.).

actions 118 and 119 of
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the spectre of the possibility of assigning personal liability to
directors in the context of an oppression action. Insofar as these
personal liabilities are imposed when directors are acting on
behalf of the corporation, this is a further example of ignoring the
legal implications of separate legal personhood.

D.

Breaking down of the significance of the separate
legal identity of the corporation

I have argued in other work that the pervasiveness of the
so-called oppression remedy in corporate litigation is a testament
to a breaking down of the significance of the separate legal
identity of the corporation. This provision in federal and
provincial business corporations statutes is a remedy available
where an act of the corporation or its directors produces a result,
or the business of the corporation has been carried on, or the
powers of the directors have been exercised in a manner which is
"oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards" the
interests of security holders, creditors, directors or officers.
Although the class of complainants is broadly cast, the legislative
history suggests that the motivation was to give a remedy to
minority shareholders of companies where directors' actions
were oppressive to them, and there were limited exit options. The
remedy has been successfully argued for in cases where directors
have tried to "squeeze out" the minority shareholder by
reorganizing the share structure of corporation22 or they have,
through amalgamation, radically transformed the business
interests of company" or where "managing shareholders have
engaged in self-dealing at the expense of the corporation and the
interests of some individual shareholders." Significantly, one of
the unresolved issues about the scope of the oppression remedy
has been whether it can be made available against shareholders ot
the company. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Brant Investments

22
23
24

Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp., (1983) 43 O.R. (2d) 128 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Ferguson].
Palmer v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada, (1987) 37 B.L.R. 316 (Ont.
H C), rev'd (1989) 67 O.R. (2d) 161 (Div. Ct).
Neri v. Finch Hardware (1976) Ltd., (1995) 20 B.L.R. (2d) 216 (Ont. Gen.
Div.).
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Ltd. v. Keeprite Inchad been firm about the fact that no
fiduciary duty flows from majority shareholders to the minority.
However, the recent case of Stern v. Imasco26 in October 1999
contained comments by Mr Justice Cumming to the effect that:
[t]he source of the oppression will be from within the
corporation. However, the source of the oppression can
conceivably be from someone who is merely a shareholder. For
example, it might be that a shareholder effectively controls
corporate decision-making in a closely-held corporation through
a shareholders' agreement such as to cause the wrongdoing.27

What is the relevance of this discussion to my thesis about
the increasing whittling away of the separate legal existence of
corporation? The effect of oppression cases is that the directors
can be fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the corporation but may
still oppress complainants, thereby triggering a remedy. The
remedy creates a situation where disputes among corporate actors
can be litigated directly, rather than through the persona of the
corporation as a derivative action or common law breach of duty
would require. Courts in oppression cases look inside the
corporate veil to assess the significance of corporate acts for
individual shareholders. Arguments of directors or controlling
shareholders that actions were taken in best interests of the
corporation will no longer be dispositive arguments. Indeed, the
extension of the language of "interests" to securityholders,
creditors, directors or officers suggests, as I have said elsewhere,
"that the corporation may be more accurately viewed as a site of
competing constituencies [that comprise the corporate entity]
rather than as a self-contained legal phenomenon."28 It could be
argued that oppression is a remedy for "internal" corporate actors
to seek against other internal participants. In response to this
claim I would say that first, the definition of "complainant" is not
limited to this, in that it includes registered or beneficial
securityholders, director or officers or former directors or
officers, the Director who administers the business corporation
25

(1991) 3 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.).

26

(1999) 38 C.P.C. (4lh) 347 (Ont. S.C.J.).

27

Id., para. 95.

28

M. CONDON, "Pandora's Box or Trojan Horse? Recent Developments in the
Use of the Oppression Remedy under the CBCA", [1994/95] Meredith
Lectures 466-469.
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statute, or any other person who is a proper person to make the
application. Second, a strict reading of the separate legal entity
principle would require that even shareholders be considered
"external" to the corporation. Indeed it is the shifting nature of the
categories of "insiders" and "outsiders" to the corporation that is
partly responsible for the incoherence of the separate entity
principle. Thus shareholders are insiders for purposes of
oppression but outsiders for purpose of limited liability.

E.

Recent developments in Ontario corporate law
relating to takeover bids

The next area I want to look at is the recent developments
in Ontario corporate law relating to takeover bids. In the summer
of 1998 two contested takeover bids were litigated in the Ontario
courts which arguably also bolster the position that I have been
taking here, which is that in more and more ways the separate
identity of the corporation is being ignored in decision-making
and legislation. The cases were those of CW Shareholdings Inc.
v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.,™ a decision
of Blair J. in the Ontario General Division Courts and Fente
Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.,30 cci e y
the Ontario Court of Appeal. Takeovers of course involve a
situation where a "bidder", often someone who is already a
shareholder of the corporation, makes an offer to aC(^
sufficient shares of the company so as to give that bjddercontro
over the corporation. The offer is made directly to the target
shareholders, in accordance with securities 'egjsat
requirements about disclosure of the terms of
offer griKuta
lengths of time to consider the offer and equal consideration
offered to all shareholders, and can be as ^u ilr^Thesftwc)
directors of the company as it is to the shareholders. These
decisions are interesting for a number of reas^s' s^ as Jhe
facts that the court in both cases considered the standing ot a
"bitter bidder" to be a complainant in an oppression action, the
fSat bo£ «ses involved public coitions winch « o
had been, controlled by a single family, but with much ot the

29

(1998) 38 B.L.R. (2d) 196 [hereinafter WIC].

30

(1998) 44 B.L.R. (2d) 115 [hereinafter Schneider],
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equity of the corporation provided by holders of non-voting
shares, thus raising very familiar but difficult issues of intrashareholder relations, the fact that both cases involved the
directors involved seeking to resist the takeover bid through the
use of defensive tactics, and the rhetorical language used by Blair
J., who talks about butterflies, stormy seas and tea parties to
describe the events at issue — thus demonstrating a capacity for
legal fiction-writing!

words, the separate entity principle is not a completely accurate
description of the reality of relationships among corporations,
directors, shareholders in all contexts.

The specific argument that I want to make here relates to
the holdings in these cases about the duties of directors of a
company faced with a hostile takeover bid. Commentators have
argued that the effect of the decisions in WIC and Schneider has
been to adopt "a form of the U.S. Delaware court's "Revlon
Duty"3i in which once the directors of a company have decided
that a takeover is inevitable, the duty of the board changes

In many ways the whole corpus of modem securities
regulation creates problems for the integrity of the idea of
separate personhood. How to characterize the relationship
between die bodies of corporate and securities law has been
subject of amount of commentary, usually from the point of view
of considering the alternative jurisdictional authorities and
philosophies of regulation of administrative agencies vis-a-vis the
courts.34 it is uncontroversial that securities regulation governs
the issuing of securities by issuers to public investors, in large
part through the mechanism of regulating the information that
investors should have to assist them in making infonned
investment decisions about buying and selling their securities.
Thus the regulation does not apply to those issuers who operate
businesses without selling securities "to the public" (i.e. private
companies). On the other hand it regulates a broader category of
business enterprise than corporations, including partnerships and
trusts. But insofar as issuers are corporations, securities
regulation is clearly about governing the relationship that a
corporation has with its investors/shareholders. I would argue
that in governing this relationship, the fundamental precepts of
securities regulation ignore the question of the separate
personhood of the corporation. For example, Klein and Coffee
point out that the prohibition on trading by insiders (*•£•
directors, officers or significant shareholders) on the basis of
material undisclosed information, which is a symbolicallysignificant aspect of securities law, suggests a recognition of a
responsibility flowing from those directors or shareholders
directly to other shareholders of the corporation with whom they

from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's
responsibilities... the directors' role changed from defenders of
the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the
best price for stockholders at a sale of the company.32

There is some ambiguity in the decisions of WIC and
Schneider on the question of whether maximizing value for the
shareholders requires an auction (i.e. finding competing bidders)
to be held for the company. It is also the case, as Halperin points
out, that a company with a single controlling shareholder cannot
^ bi; in P^y"if that shareholder does not want to tender to a
bid. But what is significant about these cases for present
purposes, I think, is that it makes explicit the lack of separation
between the corporation and its shareholders when it comes to
irec ors judging the merits of a takeover. The consequence of
the separate entity doctrine as it applies to directors' fiduciary
duties is suspended m the context of takeover bids. In other
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might trade.35 In other words, the prohibition against insider
trading does not exist because the company would be thereby
harmed by the insider's activities, but because other shareholders
would be In relation to takeover bids and defensive tactics, the
animating logic of securities regulators' interventions is m terms
of preventing abuse of shareholder rights. This is seen as
paramount over a discussion of whether a board is acting in the
best interests of the company. By adopting this stance, shares
become a commodity which is tradable in spite of the implications
of that trading for the company itself.3*
In another sense, securities commissions in all provinces of
Canada are enabled to regulate and sanction issuers, as well as
directors and shareholders of issuers, in the "public interest . The
interpretation of the "public interest" in these contexts tends to
revolve around regulatory assessments of damage to the public
credibility of, and confidence in the fairness of, the securities
trading markets if particular transactions were to proceed or be
prevented from proceeding. Such transactions have included
takeover bids37, awarding stock options to key employees,33 and
the issuing of securities using exemptions from the Acts
requirements39 . The fact that trading in securities and issuer or
investor decision-making about this or the treatment of takeover
bids is considered by legislatures to be vested with a public
interest means that relations among individual issuers, their
shareholding and directorial constituencies are considered to have
svstemic implications for the capital markets and will be treated
accordingly by regulators. Individual contracting between an
issuer and its investors, [or in the "secondary" markets, among
investors], will be viewed in this more general context. These
concerns about market credibility and efficiency are in part
prompted by the fact that more individuals are becoming
investors whether directly or by way of membership of mutual
or pension funds. To reiterate, "private" exchanges between
issuers and their shareholders are subordinated to a broader set ot
concerns about the "public interest" in market behaviour.
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The standpoint of feminist analysis

Finally, another quite different position from which
questions have been raised about either the conceptual
appropriateness or empirical validity of the separate personhood
doctrine has been from the standpoint of feminist analysis. The
set of claims made here is an aspect of the general feminist
analytic preoccupation with interrogating the idea that law, in its
categories and application, is gender-neutral. Feminist legal
scholars say that this is a "fiction" about law that they seek to
expose. Feminists who have addressed this issue in the context
of corporations and corporate law have started from a number of
different places. At a conceptual level, one version of feminist
thought is critical of legal validation of separate corporate
identity, on the basis that carving out spaces and categories of
separation, autonomy and boundary-drawing is associated with
masculinity and valued on that basis, while femininity is
associated with the connectedness and altruism that allows the
(male) autonomy to exists On an empirical level we are all
familiar with the hand-wringing about the "glass ceiling and the
dearth of women on boards of corporations as directors. Less
than 10% of the directors of Canadian public corporations are
women. On this issue, though, it can hardly be said that
corporate legal norms about qualifications of directors have any
role in explaining this gap, since the qualifications imposed by
corporate law are typically minimal — involving prohibitions
against being insane or bankrupt—, precisely in order to allow
family members, including women, to be directors.
However one more fruitful place to develop a feminist
analysis is in the context of the family-run company. Many of the
insights in this area have emanated from researchers in Australia,
who have examined the role played by women as participants in
family-run businesses. One of the major findings of this research
has been an interrogation of the practical importance of legal
distinctions drawn between "the corporation or the business
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and other aspects of family activity.41 For example in empirical
interview-based research conducted by Belinda Fehlberg into
women's involvement in family businesses in England and
Australia, she concluded that it was not possible for the women
she studied to draw a sharp line between the business and the
family. Rather the distinction is a blurred one. Thus she reports
that she found evidence of "overlap between household and
business financial arrangements"^. Also "women were often
happy to do this [work for the business] because working in the
business gave them a sense of joint enterprise with their husband,
and provided a way of balancing work outside the home with
domestic and child care responsibilities."43 Again, "involvement
in the family business reflected the often passionate belief that
marriage and business were intimately intertwined."44 Spender,
as a result of her examination of corporate law cases which
featured women as participants, asks whether contract, as law
and economics scholars would have it, is really the "glue" that
creates the family-run business?45 She examined corporate law
cases reported in Australia over a six year time period for
evidence of women's participation, and found that 75% of the
women involved in such litigation were wives or de facto
spouses of other protagonists in the litigation 46
Returning to the jurisprudence on the oppression remedy in
Canada, it is possible to see similar evidence of what are
essentially family-based disputes being litigated as corporate
disputes via oppression because there is a corporation involved.
One of the foundational oppression remedy cases in Canada is
Ferguson 47 which involved the Imax [Systems] Corporation at
the time when it was owned by three heterosexual couples
including the Fergusons. When they divorced, she contended that
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her ex-spouse did everything he could to squeeze her out of the
company, including attempting to force redemption of the class of
shares that she owned. She sought a remedy under the
oppression provision, which was granted to her on the basis that
the conduct was oppressive, even though it may have provided
economic benefits to the corporation. The Ontario Court of
Appeal said that, when dealing with a "close" corporation, the
court may consider the relationship between the shareholders and
not simply legal rights as such. In Ferguson, the "personal"
relations between the two ex-spouses were clearly significant in
the uses that were sought to be made of the corporate form. An
even more interesting example, perhaps, is the M v. 7/48 case
involving a lesbian couple which, as is well known, became a
constitutional question of the definition of spouse under the
Family Law Act A9 What is less well known is that M and H had
run a business together, and as the relationship broke down, H
began to operate the company "as though she were the sole
owner, "so Epstein J. gave M a remedy under the oppression
provisions thus providing her with the financial support denied
by the application of family law principles. Other cases include
those of Nanejfv. Con-crete Holdings^ where a son alleged that
his parent shareholders tried to squeeze him out because they
were unhappy with his choice of partner and his lack of attention
to the business. To conclude on this issue, feminist-oriented
research suggests that in the context of a family run business, the
boundary between the company and the family is a very porous
and malleable one.

Conclusion : how to explain the breakdown of
corporate form?
If I am right that we are seeing something of a breakdown
or minimizing of the legal parameters upholding the corporate
fiction, how might this be explained? Why is it happening? One
possible explanation is the one given by Glasbeek in terms of
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political philosophy. Liberalism can much more easily encompass
the idea of individuals and individualism than it can deal with the
idea of a collective. Thus,
sovereign individuals, taking risks while they optimize their
own resources, are at the core of our political and legal
liberalism and of our market-based economic principles. The
corporation is a fly in the ointment, because, by functional
definition, it is a collective. It is a combination of capitals,
both inorganic and human.52

The contradiction between our political commitment to
individualism and the empirical evidence of corporations as
complex organizations is managed, according to Glasbeek, "by
virtue of a great legal sleight of hand, which of course is to treat
the corporation as an individual."53 The corollary of that position
presumably would be to admit that all of the examples I have
given of where the doctrine has been ignored or inconsistently
applied or fails to accord with empirical reality are simply
instances of the contradiction becoming unmanageable. From this
point of view, the lack of consistency between the rhetoric and
reality of corporate personality's existence is to be expected and
will continue.
Another possible explanation for the inconsistent
application of the legal fiction is that it has in fact outlived its
usefulness. This is partly because increasingly shareholders are
themselves corporations or institutions such as investment funds,
so individuals are sheltered from liability anyway.54 If we
compare the current era to that when the corporate legal form was
first instituted, what do we see? In the current era of megamergers, it is no longer individual investors through whom we
need to consolidate capital, but we need to obtain it from the
resources of other collective, business entities.55 In so far as
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limited liability for individuals investing in "public" companies
was the raison d'etre of recognizing the corporation historically,
this is no longer that significant a concern. Individuals who
invest do so through the media of investment funds and pension
funds, a strategy encouraged by the tax system and regulatory
regimes. At the other end of the spectrum, legislative and
contractual experience with incorporated partnerships or sole
proprietorships already suggests a lack of reliance on the
corporate legal form. So one provocative possibility is that we are
seeing the decline of the corporate legal form because it is no
longer congruent with the economic form of the corporation.
Another even more speculative possibility is that it is the
very focus on markets, which is promoted by law and economics
scholarship, that has overshadowed the importance of individual
business activities conducted through corporations. Remember
that law and economics sees the corporation as a useful economic
actor in so far as it mimics a market. Making this argument in
detail would require showing that the legislative provisions and
decisions I've discussed were animated by market-based
principles, a task which I cannot embark upon in the confines of
this paper. In general, of course, this argument accords
significant power to the intellectual influence of law and
economics to orchestrate change in the functioning of key
economic institutions. All that I would say about that, in
conclusion, is that the corporation itself has been a testament to
the power of ideas, and of fiction, to change the world.
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